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A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT BY ITS MONITOR 
 
JOSEPH A. SMITH, JR.* 
 
Since April 2012, I have served as Monitor of the consent 
judgments commonly known as the National Mortgage Settlement (the 
“Settlement”). The obligations of the mortgage servicer parties to the 
first five of such judgments1 were satisfied in March 2016.  Three 
consent judgments under the Settlement’s structure remain in effect.2 
Although the mortgage servicing settlement process is ongoing, 
completion of the first five consent judgments is an appropriate vantage 
point from which to review the Settlement and assess its impact and 
significance. This Article provides such a review and assessment based 
on my work as the Settlement’s Monitor. 
 
I. EVENTS PRECIPITATING THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 
 
The Settlement was one response to the 2008 financial crisis  
(the “Financial Crisis”).3   While you can still get into a fairly heated 
 
 
* Joseph A. Smith, Jr. is President of the Office of Mortgage Settlement Oversight, Inc., and 
a Partner at Poyner Spruill, LLP. 
1. United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00361-RMC, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 188892, at *105–06 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012). While Bank of America is the mortgage 
servicer named in the case, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Ally/GMAC,  
and Wells Fargo were all subject to the consent judgment. See Consent Judgments, United 
States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), ECF Nos. 10– 
14, for the consent judgment filing for each of the respective parties. These consent 
judgments are referred to in this article as the “National Mortgage Settlement” or the 
“Settlement” or the “NMS.” 
2. Consent Judgment, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 13-cv- 
02025-RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014), ECF No. 12; Consent Judgment, United States v. 
Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. 14-cv-01028-RMC (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2014), ECF No. 65; United 
States v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No.16-cv-00199-RJL, LEXIS 59487 (D.D.C. Mar. 
14, 2016). 
3. For an exhaustive description and discussion of the Financial Crisis, see, for 
example, THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
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argument about the causes of the Financial Crisis,4 I think (perhaps 
optimistically) that it can be agreed that misconduct and bad judgment  
in residential mortgage lending was at its epicenter. During the run-up  
to the Financial Crisis, the U.S. home ownership rate increased 
significantly, based in part on lending to borrowers who turned out to be 
unable to repay. The music stopped in 2007 and 2008 when the housing 
bubble burst, resulting in damage to a number of major real estate 
markets in the U.S. and financial markets globally. Foreclosures and 
related bankruptcy filings increased dramatically as a result. 
The experience of federal and state government agencies and the 
courts in dealing with the foreclosure tsunami arising from the Financial 
Crisis made it clear that the mortgage servicing systems of our largest 
financial institutions, which had been set up on the assumption that a 
1.5% default rate was a bad year,5 were overwhelmed by default rates 
that were much higher than that. The efforts of banks and non- 
depository servicers to address these deficiencies in capacity were way 
too little and way too late, and the impact on borrowers and the legal 
process was severe. 
“Robosigning,” a neologism referring to the signing of 
foreclosure or bankruptcy documents by people with no knowledge of 
the facts underlying such documents, was a popular catchphrase used to 
describe the dislocation in mortgage servicing, but the industry’s 
problem was far deeper and more serious than that. Filing of 
incomplete, incorrect, and even false documents was all too common, as 
were lost documents, dual tracking (proceeding with a foreclosure while 
allegedly processing a loan modification), and abusive if not illegal 
collection tactics. Worse in some ways was the  general 
unresponsiveness by servicers to distressed borrowers seeking relief, 
often leaving such borrowers in prolonged and frustrating uncertainty 
about whether they were going to get relief or lose their homes. 
Mishandling of distressed mortgage loans by major servicers not 
only resulted in consumer complaints; it led to allegations of serious 
violations of law.  Because of the interrelationship of federal and state 
 
4. See id. at viii (four of ten commissioners dissenting from the final report). 
5. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CHARGE-OFF AND 
DELINQUENCY RATES ON LOANS AND LEASES AT COMMERCIAL BANKS (last updated Nov. 18, 
2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/delallsa.htm (showing average 
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laws in the origination and sale of residential home mortgages, abuses  
in the mortgage market violated both state and federal law. Each of the 
consent judgments comprising the Settlement is based on allegations of 
violations of, “among other laws, the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and 
Practices law of the Plaintiff States, the False Claims Act, the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and the Bankruptcy Code and Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.”6 Sorting these claims out in federal  
and state courts would have involved the expenditure of many millions 
of dollars and years of effort with little certainty of outcome. So the 
parties settled. 
 
II. THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 
 
The Settlement was made up of five consent judgments between 
the United States Government and forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia, on the one hand (the “Government Parties”), and five major 
financial institutions (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citi, Wells 
Fargo and Ally) on the other (the “Servicers”). In exchange  for  a 
release from liability for the claims mentioned above, the Servicers 
agreed to three sets of obligations: (i) cash payments to governments  
and foreclosed homeowners, (ii) soft-dollar relief to distressed and 
underwater borrowers,7 and (iii) adoption of servicing standards or rules 
of conduct to deal with distressed loans. The Settlement was an 
agreement by the parties to forego full and final litigation of the claims 
mentioned above in favor of a resolution that provided substantial and 
immediate financial payments and relief to governments and consumers 
in exchange for release of the Servicers from the claims with the largest 
potential financial and reputational consequences. 
The Settlement did not release the Servicers from all potential 
liabilities arising from their residential mortgage activities. It did not,  
for example, release them from potential liability for violation of federal 
fair  lending  laws.    Further,  it  did  not  cut  off  potential  claims  by 
 
 
6. E.g., Bank of Am. Corp., LEXIS 188892, at *15. 
7. “Distressed” borrowers were delinquent in their payments, generally more than 90 
days past due; “underwater” borrowers were current on their mortgage payments but unable 
to refinance their loans because the value of the mortgaged property was less than the 
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aggrieved individual borrowers who wished to pursue them, and it 
explicitly prohibited the conditioning of relief on a waiver of rights 
other than in settlement of pending litigation.8 Finally, it did not settle 
potential criminal claims or claims for fraud in the origination and sale 
of the mortgage backed securities.9 This last category of claims has 
resulted in additional litigation brought both by government and private 
parties, and has resulted in a number of significant and costly additional 
settlements.10 
The Settlement was and is the subject of much debate regarding 
its wisdom, sufficiency, and effectiveness. It has been criticized with 
varying degrees of subtlety from a variety of viewpoints for: (i) giving 
inadequate or illusory relief to borrowers; (ii) being a soft extortion by 
governments that does not meet the actual needs of borrowers; and (iii) 
failing to hold “too big to fail” banks and their executives accountable 
for causing the Financial Crisis. While I think much of the criticism  
fails to adequately credit the Settlement’s achievements, discussed 
below, it persists nonetheless, likely because of a perceived lack of 
retribution—namely, jail time for bank executives. 
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 
 
In my view, the Settlement was a valuable and effective 
resolution of outstanding claims by all of its parties for a number of 
reasons, including: 
 
• Size and Scope. The Settlement addressed the 
alleged misconduct of mortgage servicers that 
accounted for over 50% of the market.11   The 
 
8. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., 188892, at *278–86 (setting out “Claims and Other 
Actions Exempted from Release” by the state plaintiffs). 
9. See, e.g., id. at *287–95 (setting out federal claims “specifically reserved and . . . 
not released”). 
10. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners 
Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Inv’rs About 
Sec. Containing Toxic Mortgs. (Nov. 19, 2013) (announcing a $13 billion settlement 
between the DOJ and JPMorgan “arising out of the packaging, marketing, sale and issuance 
of residential mortgage-backed securities”); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bank of Am. to 
Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Dep’t Settlement for Fin. Fraud Leading up to and 
During the Fin. Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014) (announcing a $16.65 billion settlement between the 
DOJ and Bank of America for the same practices). 
11. Larry Cordell, et al., Fed. Reserve Bd., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: 
  
 
2017] THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 33 
relief it obtained from the banks included $5 
billion in aggregate cash payments to 
governments and foreclosed homeowners, which 
exceeded by a multiple of two to three times, per 
bank, anything any financial firm had paid in 
prior settlements.12 
• Relief to Distressed Borrowers. The Settlement 
required the granting of approximately $20 
billion in “soft dollar” relief to distressed 
borrowers, including debt modification or 
forgiveness, refinancing of underwater loans, 
and short sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure 
assistance. This requirement ultimately led to 
over $50 billion in gross dollar relief to more 
than 640,000 families around the  country.13  
This relief came at a time when millions of 
borrowers needed it and when the parties would 




Myths and Realities 14 (2008) (showing “Large Servicer Holdings of High-Risk  
Mortgages” at year-end 2007). 
12. Prior to the Financial Crisis, the largest financial institution settlement was the  
2003 settlement obligating ten Wall Street firms to pay a total of $1.4 billion for various 
conflicts of interest. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms 
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and 
Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003) (announcing penalties for implicated firms ranging 
from $32.5 million to $400 million). The Settlement’s $5 billion cash payment required 
JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, Ally/GMAC, and Wells Fargo to pay $1.08 billion, 
$3.24 billion, $415 million, $110 million, and $1.01 billion, respectively. Summary of 
National Mortgage Settlement, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 11 (Mar. 12, 2012), http:// 
www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/Summary- 
of-AG-Settlement-3-12-12.pdf. At the time it was reached, the Settlement was the second 
largest ever obtained by U.S. attorneys general, the largest being the $206 billion 1998 
Master Tobacco Settlement. Because the disparity between the  settlements in the total  
dollar amount is undoubtedly great, the overall breadth of the NMS may be better reflected 
by its similarities to the Master Tobacco Settlement in its imposition of sweeping 
institutional reform. For more on the Master Tobacco Settlement, see TOBACCO CONTROL 
LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW (2015), http:// 
publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-msa-overview-2015.pdf. 
13. OFFICE OF MORTG. SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT, ORIGINAL SERVICERS’ FINAL 
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• Establishing Servicing Standards.  The 
Settlement also required the banks to comply 
with over 300 servicing standards, or rules of 
conduct, in their handling of distressed home 
loans.14 These rules went into effect at a time 
when the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”) was just organizing itself and before 
Richard Cordray had been confirmed as  
Director. The CFPB ultimately issued final 
servicing rules (similar to but not the same as the 
NMS servicing standards), which are now in 
effect.15 The Settlement’s rules governed a 
substantial portion of the market before the 
CFPB rules were issued and when the finality of 
such rules was in doubt.16 
 
• Cooperation Among Governments and Across 
Party Lines. As noted above, the Federal 
Government, forty-nine States and the District of 
Columbia were parties to the Settlement. Each  
of the consent judgments contained an 
agreement between the governments not only on 
settlement terms, but also a cooperative 
governance structure.17   The Settlement was the 
 
14. See, e.g., United States, v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00361-RMC, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 188892, at *181–215 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012). Spreadsheet view available at 
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/05/Servicing- 
Standards-Spreadsheet-1.xlsx. 
15. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.30–41 
(2016). 
16. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10696, 10701-02 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 1024) (discussing the regulatory framework for mortgage servicing prior to the CFPB 
and Regulation X). Additionally, on October 11, 2016, the District of Columbia Circuit  
ruled that the CFPB was unconstitutionally structured, in violation of Article II of the 
Constitution, but held that it would strike down only the provision of Dodd-Frank Act 
limiting the President to removing the single director of CFPB for cause in order to remedy 
constitutional violation. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). On February 16, 2017, the D.C. Circuit granted the CFPB’s petition  for 
rehearing en banc, scheduling PHH’s brief to be due March 10th and the CFPB’s brief to be 
due March 21st, with oral arguments to be heard on May 24, 2017. Petition for Rehearing  
En Banc Granted, PHH Corp., 839 F.3d 1 (No. 15-1177). 
17. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., LEXIS 188892, at *181 (establishing “[a] committee 
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first major post-Dodd-Frank enforcement action 
in this regard, in contrast to the pre-Dodd-Frank 
world where State-Federal jurisdictional conflict 
was common.18 It is also at least interesting to 
note that of the forty-nine State Attorneys 
General who signed on, twenty-five were 
Democrats and twenty-four were Republicans. 
• Enforcement Through Supervisory Means. In 
order to ease compliance concerns, the 
Settlement set up a “Monitor” to oversee the 
banks’ performance.19 The employment of a 
monitor has become increasingly common in 
financial and other settlements. The NMS is 
somewhat unique in that it established a detailed 
supervisory approach to oversight—visitation 
and measurement by testing—under which the 
Monitor was to function. As Monitor, I hired a 
small army of professionals through whom I 
confirmed that the banks had: (i) granted all of 
the “consumer relief” to distressed borrowers 
required by the Settlement and (ii) complied  
with the Settlement’s servicing standards. This 
confirmation was not a formal audit; rather, it 
was validation of the bank’s own assessment 
through   agreed   statistical   sampling   of  their 
 
comprising representatives of the state Attorneys General, State Financial Regulators, the 
U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development” 
to facilitate enforcement of settlement terms). 
18. Compare Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007) (holding that 
National Bank Act did not preempt state registration and inspection requirements for a 
federally chartered bank and its state-chartered mortgage subsidiary), and Cuomo v. 
Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 529 (2009) (holding that the Comptroller’s regulation 
purporting to preempt state law enforcement was not a reasonable interpretation of the 
National Bank Act) with Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10706 (“The Bureau has considered each of 
these comments relating to the cumulative impact of mortgage regulation, including the 
mortgage servicing rules; the potential for inconsistent results with current servicing 
obligations, including State law and the National Mortgage Settlement.”). 
19. See, e.g., Bank of America Corp., LEXIS 188892, at *185-86 (providing that “[i]t 
shall be the responsibility of the Monitor to determine whether Servicer is in compliance 
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performance. In operation, the Settlement 
resembled the supervisory work I did as North 
Carolina Commissioner of Banks. Given its 
structure, the choice of a supervisor rather than a 
prosecutor to act as Monitor is understandable. 
 
• Supervision by a Federal Judge. Unlike a  
number of other settlements, the National 
Mortgage Settlement was and is under the 
continuing jurisdiction of a court, in this case, 
the United States District Court for the District  
of Columbia. The court reviewed and accepted 
the filing of Settlement documents before 
performance of its terms began in 2012, and has 
exercised continuing jurisdiction  ever  since. 
This ongoing court supervision has 
accomplished a number of important goals for 
the Settlement: (i) independent and continuing 
judicial review and oversight of both its terms 
and implementation; (ii) public access to the 
reports I have filed as Monitor; and (iii) a venue 
for the resolution of collateral claims and 
disputes. 
 
• Limited Duration. Each consent judgment that  
is part of the Settlement has a defined term that 
ends with a “hard stop.” The servicing standards 
of the original five judgments “sunset” as  to 
each of the servicer parties in October of 2015, 
and my final report on their compliance  was 
filed with the court in March of 2016.20 Three 
consent judgments remain in effect today, but 
each of them also has a hard stop in 2017 or 
2018.      After   sunset,   each   servicer  remains 
 
20. OFFICE OF MORTG. SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT, ORIGINAL SERVICERS’ FINAL 
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subject to regulation by the CFPB and the States. 
 
Although I did not participate in the negotiation of the 
Settlement, I am—I hope pardonably—biased in its favor. It met a clear 
public need by establishing binding rules on the handling of distressed 
mortgage loans while the CFPB was being stood up and caused the 
major banks to provide a substantial amount of badly needed debt relief 
to distressed borrowers.  Having done its work, it now ends. 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 
 
So, what lessons do I take away from my service as Monitor? 
First, the regulation and supervision of consumer finance generally— 
and home mortgage finance in particular—is an exercise in the 
management of complexity. Servicing of consumer loans is a systems- 
driven activity that is well suited to the handling of loans  that  are 
current and performing and ill-suited to the handling loans that are not. 
The legal requirements confronting financial services firms in handling 
distressed loans, including state foreclosure laws, federal and state 
consumer protection laws, and bankruptcy are complex and vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and court to court. Programming servicing 
systems to deal with federal and state legal and regulatory requirements 
is mind-numbingly complex, expensive, and  prone  to  error. 
Compliance is costly and non-compliance is risky and potentially 
costlier. These risks and costs may lead to further or continued 
concentration of the financial services industry and marginally  
increased costs and reduced availability of credit to consumers. 
The Settlement accommodated these difficulties by making 
performance subject to rigorous rules measured by tests with reasonable 
margins of error. Absent this fault-tolerant approach, two solutions to 
the complexity  problem, neither very satisfactory, suggest  themselves: 
(i) conformity of our legal and regulatory practices to the requirements 
of large institutions’ systems; or (ii) admission that compliance with all 
applicable law cannot be done by systems and must be done manually, 
with the attendant increase in cost and loss of efficiency. Pick your 
poison. 
Second, time-limited and properly supervised interventions like 
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regulatory regimes. Such interventions can be tailored to a specific 
problem and adapted to changing circumstances quickly and flexibly. 
While they aren’t a cure-all, such interventions are useful tools that  
have the added benefit of self-liquidation. There is potential for  
focused, effective, and limited government here if governments and 
regulated industries will use them. 
Finally, the interests of all stakeholders to financial settlements 
are best served by openness in terms of process and implementation. As 
noted above, my reports to the court were public; further, with the help 
of very skilled communications experts, I reported to the public in a 
summary and relatively non-technical way. My operations were 
conducted through a not-for-profit corporation whose financial 
statements were audited and made public. While these features of the 
NMS did not satisfy all of its critics, I think they went a long way to 
establishing trust in its integrity. 
I hope that these lessons are at least considered as the post- 
Dodd-Frank regulatory structure for consumer finance develops; 
however, it is not clear that they will be. To date, the  National  
Mortgage Settlement is “one of a kind.” 
V. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
Years after the Financial Crisis, there remains a significant 
amount of distrust in government, the financial system, and in 
settlements that bring the two together. It is highly unlikely that any 
settlement can meet the popular desire for retribution. The cost/benefit 
analysis from both government and financial services firms that lead to 
settlements is cold, complex, and difficult to  explain.  This  doesn’t 
mean it’s wrong to settle; just that the settling parties have to rebut a 
number of negative presumptions about their motives and perhaps their 
competence. 
I believe the National Mortgage Settlement supports the 
proposition that fostering public trust and confidence in settlements is 
best achieved by open processes and clear disclosure of  results.  
Whether the National Mortgage Settlement is emulated in the future or 
not, I hope its lessons are not lost. 
